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DECIDING NOT TO DECIDE: FEDERAL COURTS'
DISCRETION TO DECLINE REVIEW AND
MILLER V CITY OF WICKLIFFE
Tommy Tobin*

I. INTRODUCTION
The case or controversy requirement mandates that cases in federal
courts be justiciable.' Unfortunately, it is far from a simple task for
courts to determine whether any particular dispute is one that is
The Sixth
"appropriately resolved through the judicial process."
Circuit's March 2017 decision in Miller v. City of Wickliffe' provides
insight into just how difficult and divisive justiciability analysis can be
for federal jurists.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, which are
constitutionally confined to adjudicating actual cases or controversies.'
One of the core components of this case or controversy requirement is
the threshold issue of standing.' If a plaintiff lacks standing, the claim
fails on the threshold issue of justiciability.6 Put another way, the
doctrine of standing restricts the courts to resolving actual disputes

* J.D., Harvard Law School, M.P.P., Harvard Kennedy School. The author thanks
Professors Aaron Nielson, Leah Litman, Susannah Barton Tobin, and Ben Trachtenberg for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. All errors and omissions are my own.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60
(1992).
2. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990); see also Miller v. City of Wickliffe,
852 F.3d 497, 502 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 154-55).
3. 852 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2017).
4. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Federal courts are further limited as cases involving
probate matters or domestic relations are not within their jurisdiction. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547
U.S. 293, 308 (2006). These exclusions draw from both Supreme Court precedent and language
from the Judiciary Act of 1789. Id.
5. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
6. See Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 234-39 (4th Cir. 2013).
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"rather than emit[ting] random advice."7 Standing is "an indispensable
part of the plaintiff s case."'
In Miller, a split appellate panel disagreed as to which justiciability
standard to apply.9 As described in further detail below, the case
involved a motel attempting to secure a nightclub tenant for its lounge
space and local city ordinances that allegedly frustrated that effort.'(' The
majority dismissed the case using Article III standing analysis, which
addresses injury, causation, and redressability." Finding that the
plaintiffs lacked a concrete injury, the Miller court ruled that the
plaintiffs had no standing to bring the suit.' 2

Writing in a separate concurrence, Judge John M. Rogers would
have dismissed the case based not on Article III standing, but instead on
judge-made prudential standards for the court to decline judicial review.
As he put it, the plaintiffs' "request for pre-performance judicial review
of [the ordinance] is not ripe-not in the constitutional sense
of the doctrine, but based on the court's equitable discretion to
decline review."

3

Recent Supreme Court precedent has labeled it a "virtually
unflagging" obligation for federal courts to hear and decide cases within
their jurisdiction.' 4 While acknowledging this line of precedent, Judge
Rogers noted that prudential discretion is not a dead doctrine, at least not
yet.' 5 Accordingly, this Essay examines prudential standing, and
prudential standards more generally, within the context of this case.
Part II discusses the role of standing in general and provides an overview
of the well-known Article III standing analysis. Part III examines
prudential justiciability, or judge-made limitations on the exercise of
jurisdiction. Part IV examines the importance of the distinction between
Article III and prudential justiciability analysis. Part V details the Miller
case itself and evaluates prudential standards, particularly prudential
standing, in light of the Sixth Circuit's recent ruling. Part VI concludes.
7. Bryant v. Cheney. 924 F.2d 525, 529 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11. 20 (1998).
8. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
9.
10.

See infia notes I 1-13 and accompanying text.
See infa Part V.

11.

See Miller v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2017); see also Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560-61 (articulating the three-part test for standing).

12.

See Miller, 853 F.3d at 507.

13.

Id. at 507 (Rogers, J., concurring).

14.

Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components. Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)

(quoting Sprint Commc'ns Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)); see also Susan B. Anthony

List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014) (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386).
15. See Miller, 852 F.3d at 507-08. For another expression of this point, see MONTY PYTHON
AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Michael White Productions 1975) ("[H]e says he's not dead [yet].").
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JUSTICIABILITY STANDARDS: THRESHOLD ISSUES FOR THE COURTS

Article III justiciability is embedded in the Constitution's
requirement that federal courts are restricted to addressing "cases or
controversies."" As the Supreme Court has noted, Article III
justiciability analysis has an "iceberg quality," containing beneath its
"surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart
of our constitutional form of government."" Outlining the difficulties in
"giving precise meaning and form to the concept of Justiciability," Chief
Justice Earl Warren noted that justiciability itself is of "uncertain
meaning and scope," with its reach best illustrated by areas where it has
found inapplicable: political questions, advisory opinions, questions
rendered moot by later developments, and when standing is lacking."
Justiciability is a defining feature of the federal judiciary's role in
the constitutional system." Standing is "perhaps the most important
condition for a justiciable claim." 20 Standing determines whether a
plaintiff is the proper party to bring a suit,21 and its central purpose is to
"ensure that the parties before the court have a concrete interest in the
outcome of the proceedings such that they can be expected to frame the
issues properly." 22 Unfortunately, it is a far from simple task for courts
to determine whether any particular dispute is one that is "appropriately
resolved through the judicial process."23
The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test for
standing, 24 which has these essential elements: injury, causation, and
redressability.2 5 First, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove
that they have suffered an "injury in fact," a term of art related to a
16. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83. 94 (1968).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 95; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) ("The
doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III's 'case' or
'controversy' language, no less than standing does.").
19. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) ("No principle is more
fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional
limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at
94)).
20. Zargarpur v. Townsend, 18 F. Supp. 3d 734, 737 (E.D. Va. 2013) (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
21. See Raines v. Byrd. 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38 (1976)).
22. ProEnglish v. Bush, 70 F. App'x 84, 87 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d
1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1994)).
23. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990) (citing Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)); see also
Miller v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at
154-55).
24. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
25. Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1997).
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concrete, particularized, actual, and imminent invasion of a legally
protected interest.2 6 Such an injury must actually exist and cannot be
merely hypothetical or conjectural.
Second, the party must show a
causal connection between the injury alleged and the conduct of the
defendant.2 ' Third, it must be "likely," rather than speculative, that the
injury will be redressed if the court were to deliver a favorable
decision. 2 ' The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to
establish each of the elements of the three-part test.
The doctrine of standing, specifically its injury-in-fact requirement,
contrasts with two impermissible types of suits in federal courts:
"generalized grievances" and advisory opinions. Cases presenting
"generalized grievances" common to all members of the public and an
undifferentiated impact are impermissible. t Put another way,
taxpayers-just by virtue of their tax paying status-do not have
sufficient standing to challenge every government action or
expenditure. 32 One important, yet narrow, exception is that of Flast v.
Cohen," which provides taxpayer standing to challenge the use of
federal funds that allegedly violate the Establishment Clause. 34 Advisory
opinions are similarly impermissible. Unlike many state courts, federal
courts lack the power to render advisory opinions.3 Drawing from the
Article III "case or controversy" requirement, federal courts have
"neither the power to render advisory opinions nor 'to decide questions
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.'"3
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)).
Id. (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155).
Id.
Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
Id. (citing FW/PBS. Inc. v. Dallas. 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)).

31. Id. at 570. While many courts analyze this "generalized grievance" test within its Article
III standing analysis, Professor Craig A. Stern has noted that this test can (and has) been used under
both Article III and prudential standing rubrics. Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the
Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1214 (2008) (finding that the generalized grievance doctrine "has
variously been categorized as constitutional, prudential, or perhaps both, for nearly its entire history,
including up to the present").

32.

Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) ("It has long been

established, however, that the payment of taxes is generally not enough to establish standing to
challenge an action taken by the Federal Government.").

33.

392 U.S. 83 (1968).

34. Id. at 103-06. In Hein, the Court reaffirmed the existence of this narrow Flast v. Cohen
exception, writing, "We do not extend Flast, but we also do not overrule it. We leave Flast as we

found it."551 U.S. at 615.
35. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.LO.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) ("As is
well known the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render
advisory opinions.").

36.

Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss2/11
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Federal court judgments must address "a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character."3 7
Closely related to the injury-in-fact test, cases in federal court must
also be ripe for decision and not premature or speculative.38 This
ripeness doctrine represents another constitutional prerequisite to the
exercise of federal jurisdiction.39 This ripeness requirement ensures that
the federal courts address definite and concrete disputes, not
hypothetical or abstract ones.40 As the Ninth Circuit noted en banc,
"ripeness is 'peculiarly a question of timing,"' designed to "prevent the
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements." 4 1 Unfortunately, as the Ninth
Circuit noted, "[s]orting out where standing ends and ripeness begins is
not an easy task," and is made that much more difficult as courts often
treat the constitutional component of ripeness under the rubric of
standing analysis, particularly in applying its injury-in-fact prong.42 The
Supreme Court and leading scholars have suggested that Article III
standing and ripeness concerns may "boil down to the same question."43
III.

PRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLES:

A

SECOND LEG TO STAND ON?

While Article III is a primary source of justiciability doctrines,
44
these doctrines may also draw from prudential, or judge-made, sources.
Even if a suit meets the Article III case or controversy requirement, a
court may decline review under a second strain of prudential
justiciability jurisprudence. 45 This second strand encompasses "judicially
244, 246 (1971)).
37. Id. at 395 (quoting Rice, 404 U.S. at 246).
38. Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 834-35 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing United Transp. Union v.
Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2000)).
39. Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)); see also Oklevueha
Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Ripeness is one
component of the Article III case or controversy requirement.").

40. See Ry. Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945).
41. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (first quoting Reg'1 Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974); and then
quoting Abbott, 387 U.S. at 148).
42.

Id.

43. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5 (2014) (quoting Meadow
Immune, Inc. v. Greentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007)); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified
Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REv. 677, 682-83 (1990); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and
the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 172 (1987) ("[When] measuring whether the litigant has
asserted an injury that is real and concrete rather than speculative and hypothetical, the ripeness
inquiry merges almost completely with standing . . . .").

44. See Portman v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The ripeness
inquiry contains both a constitutional and a prudential component.").

45. Ansley v. Warren, No. 116-CV-54, 2016 WL 5213937, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2016)
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self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 46 Under this
prudential justiciability rubric, courts may decline to review cases based
on prudential standing or prudential ripeness, along with other related
judge-made doctrines.47 As examples, prudential concerns could be
useful for the courts to avoid political questions or compromising
national security.48
Prudential standing has not been "exhaustively defined" but has
encompassed several general principles in the past, namely: "[T]he
general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights,
the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked." 49 Given the general nature of the
prudential standing principles, courts have crafted certain inquiries, such
as that of the zone of interests, and certain specialized tests, such as
those developed for Lanham Act cases and bankruptcy appeals. 5 o

(quoting Doe v. Va. Dep't. of State Police, 713 F.3d 745. 753 (4th Cir. 2013)).
46. Id. (quoting Doe, 713 F.3d at 753).
47. For example, abstention doctrines also provide for judge-made determinations as to
whether to abstain from exercising their jurisdiction in certain situations. There are four main
abstention doctrines, each given an eponymous name: ColoradoRiver Water Conservation Dist. v.
UnitedStates, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976) ("Colorado River" Abstention); Younger i. Harris, 401

U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) ("Younger" Abstention); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943)
("Burford' Abstention); and R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (The
"Pullman" Doctrine).

48. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (discussing the significance of political
questions); Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 913 (9th Cir. 2011) ("To be sure, prudential
concerns may weigh against standing in certain cases affecting national security interests, but the
national security context does not, in itself, erect a new or separate prudential bar to standing.").
Prudential concerns are not the only limitation on the role of the judiciary in deciding national
security matters; for example, the government could also assert the state secrets doctrine. See
Tommy Tobin, Abilt v. CIA: The Secret Case of the Sleepy Spy, WAKE FOREST L. REV.: 4TH CtR.
BLOG (Feb. 15, 2017), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2017/02/guest-post-abilt-v-cia-the-secretcase-of-the-sleepy-spy.

49. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12, (2004) (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)), partially abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386-88 & n.3 (2014); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500
(1975).
50. S. Todd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 101
(2014). The Lanham Act concerns commercial trademarks. In a recent Lanham Act case, the Court
emphasized the importance of avoiding the "premature adjudication of constitutional questions" and
stressed that courts "ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is

unavoidable." Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1755 (2017) (first quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681, 690 (1997); and then quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105
(1944)).
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As noted elsewhere, prudential standing is technically not standing
at all. In The Story qf Prudential Standing, Professor Todd Brown
defined it as "merely a judicially crafted set of exceptions to the
obligation to hear and decide matters that are within the court's
jurisdiction."5 2 At least one article has argued that the lines between
prudential standing and Article III standing "should be erased" and that
all standing requirements should be prudential." As detailed below, the
distinction remains between the two strands of standing, and the
continuing vitality of prudential standing has been called into question.54
Related to prudential standing concerns, prudential ripeness is also
a separate inquiry from its Article III counterpart. As the Supreme Court
detailed, "[r]ipeness reflects constitutional considerations that implicate
'Article III limitations on judicial power,' as well as 'prudential reasons
for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.""' Courts analyzing cases for
prudential ripeness examine "'the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision' and 'the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.""' A court may raise prudential ripeness concerns on its
own motion:
IV.

DOES THE ARTICLE III OR PRUDENTIAL JUSTICIABILITY
DISTINCTION MATTER?

Federal courts may distinguish between justiciability doctrines
derived from Article III or judge-made sources and provide separate
strains of analysis for each source." Unfortunately, distinguishing the

51.

Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 677 (6th Cir. 2007)

("Because these prudential principles are 'limits' on standing, they do not themselves create
jurisdiction; they exist only to remove jurisdiction where the Article III standing requirements are
otherwise satisfied.").
52. Brown, supra note 50, at 96.

53. Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for PrudentialStanding, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 727, 728, 749-56
(2009).
54. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014); see also Bradford
C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or Waiting for a Comeback: Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 213 (2015).

55. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010) (quoting
Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., Inc. 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)).
56. Id. at 670-71 n.2 (quoting Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S.
803, 808 (2003)); Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir.
2000) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
57. Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18 ("Even when a ripeness question in a particular case is
prudential, we may raise it on our own motion, and 'cannot be bound by the wishes of the parties."'

(quoting Reg'I Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974))).
58. See Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 838-39 (9th
Cir. 2012) (analyzing prudential ripeness separately from constitutional ripeness).
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true source between related justiciability doctrines can be a difficult
process. 9 Recent Supreme Court decisions have called into doubt the
continued vitality of prudential justiciability doctrines, writing that a
federal court has a "virtually unflagging" obligation to hear cases within
its jurisdiction.6 o The Court has gone so far as to note that federal courts
"cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because
'prudence' dictates."61 With this strong language from the Court, it can
be a fraught process for jurists to distinguish between prudential or
constitutional aspects of related justiciability doctrines.
Articulating the source of a justiciability doctrine may be outcome
determinative in some cases. Article III standing, for example, may be
raised sua sponte by a court if it is not raised by the parties as a matter of
the court's jurisdiction.6 2 Put another way, the case cannot progress
without constitutional standing as the court must have standing in order
to exercise its jurisdiction. Prudential standing, by contrast, is subject to
a circuit split as to whether the court must fulfill its requirements in
order to exercise jurisdiction. As shown below, prudential standing is a
jurisdictional requirement in only a minority of circuits. In at least
three circuits, the court must have prudential standing in order to
exercise jurisdiction.6 4 In the plurality of circuits, prudential standing
considerations are waived by the parties if not raised, meaning that these
concerns are non-jurisdictional.6 ' By contrast, Article III standing is
undeniably jurisdictional and cannot be waived, meaning that appellate
courts may dismiss actions sua sponte for lack of Article III standing.66

59. Kentucky v. U.S. ex rel. Hagel, 759 F.3d 588, 596 n.3 (6th Cir. 2014) ("As with standing
and ripeness, there are constitutional and prudential aspects to the mootness doctrine as well, but it
is not always easy to distinguish the constitutional aspects of mootness, grounded in Article 111.
from the prudential ones, grounded in policy . . . ." (first citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S 737, 750
(1984); and then citing U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 420 n.15 (1980))).
60. See Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (quoting Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v, Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (quoting Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 591); see also
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014) (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at
1386).
61. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388.
62. See Doe v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 496 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2007).
63. See infra Table 1.
64. See infra Table 1.
65. See infra Table 1.
66. See, e.g., Doe, 494 F.3d at 496 ("Standing is a jurisdictional requirement and not subject
to waiver. A federal court must consider its jurisdiction sua sponte." (citations omitted) (first citing
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 (1996); and then citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Evn't, 523 U.S. 83, 93 (1998))); Cooks v. Pye, 43 F. App'x 108, 109 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Where a
party lacks standing, this Court must address the issue sua sponte." (citing Bernhardt v. Cty. of Los
Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002))).
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A recent D.C. Circuit case, Grocery Manufacturers Association v.
E.P.A.6 ("GIL4"), demonstrates the importance of distinguishing
between a prudential justiciability source and one derived from the
constitutional requirements of Article III. In that case, the appellate
panel split, with the majority finding that the parties before it had
Article III standing but lacked prudential standing." Finding that
prudential standing was a jurisdictional requirement, the majority
determined that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.69 In that
case, the panel found that the plaintiff group failed the zone of interests
test. 70 Under that test, a party "must show that the interest it seeks to

protect is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute .. . in question or by any provision integrally
related to it.""
There is ample scholarly debate about whether the rules of
prudential standing are jurisdictional.72 At least two articles have argued
that prudential standing is not jurisdictional, unlike Article III standing,
If prudential standing is not jurisdictional, it
which is jurisdictional.
can be waived if not invoked by the parties.74 Such a view is supported
by recent Supreme Court dicta, which lumped prudential ripeness
concerns along with the doctrine against third-party standing-a
prudential standing concern-and found neither to be jurisdictional and
thus deemed both to be waived.

67.

693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

68. Id. at 179 ("Hypothetical prudential standing to challenge action ... does not give the
food petitioners prudential standing to petition for review of action taken pursuant to [Clean Air
Act] Section 211 (f)(4)."). In this case, Judge Tatel, writing in concurrence, and Judge Kavanaugh,
writing in dissent, found that the entity has Article III standing, but the case was ultimately
dismissed as Judge Tatel and Judge Santelle agreed that the parties lacked jurisdiction due to the
prudential standing issue. See id. at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring); id. at 183 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).

69.
70.
71.

Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 179.
Id. (quoting Nat'l Petrochemical Refiners Ass'n. v. E.P.A., 287 F.3d 1130, 1147 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (per curiam)).
72. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Is PrudentialStanding Jurisdictional?, 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 413 (2013) (discussing the treatment of prudential standing as jurisdictional versus
non-jurisdictional).
73. See id at 442-53; Micah J. Revell, Comment, PrudentialStanding, the Zone ofInterests,
and the New Jurisprudenceof Jurisdiction,63 EMORY L.J. 221, 251-59 (2013).
74. See Revell, supra note 73, at 258.

75.

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 729

(2010); see also Revell, supra note 73, at 258.
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A circuit split has developed as to the issue of the jurisdictional
nature of prudential standing. As detailed in Judge Tatel's concurrence
in GM4, the D.C. Circuit has found for decades that prudential standing
is indeed jurisdictional.7 6' The Second and Sixth Circuits have also
decided that prudential standing is a non-waivable issue ofjurisdiction. 7
Writing in the GMA dissent, Judge Kavanaugh argued that Supreme
Court precedent made clear that prudential standing is not
jurisdictional.7 ' He decried the "sloppy and profligate use of the term
'jurisdiction' by lower courts" and even the Supreme Court itself.7' As
the respondent in GMA did not raise the prudential standing issue, Judge
Kavanaugh's dissent argued that the issue was waived.o Judge
Kavanaugh found that reaching the merits would have reversed the
outcome in the case-with the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") likely to fail on the merits, but instead emerging as the victor
on the dismissal due to the prudential standing finding.8
Judge Kavanaugh's dissent labeled the circuit split on prudential
standing "deep and important."82 Collecting cases, he found that the
Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits each ruled
that prudential standing is non-jurisdictional and may be waived if not

76. Grocert' M-s., 693 F.3d at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring) ("Prudential standing is of course,
like Article III standing, a jurisdictional concept." (quoting Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 697 (D.C.
Cir. 1994))); Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 723 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
("Standing, whether constitutional or prudential, is a jurisdictional issue which cannot be waived or
conceded.").

77.

See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 508 F.3d 827, 835 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that the

court has an "independent obligation to police [its] own jurisdiction" and analyzing Article Ill and
prudential standing sua sponte (quoting S.E.C. v. Basic Energy & Affiliated Res., Inc., 273 F.3d

657, 665 (6th Cir. 2001))); Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 2000);
Thompson v. Cty. of Franklin. 15 F.3d 245, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1994); Cmty. First Bank v. Nat'l Credit
Union Admin., 41 F.3d 1050, 1053 (6th Cir. 1994) ("We find no authority for the plaintiffs'
argument that prudential standing requirements may be waived by the parties. Recognizing a
distinction between prudential and constitutional standing requirements in this context might give
careless parties power to override congressional intent.").
78. Grocery Mjs., 693 F.3d at 183 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

79.

Id.

80. Id at 185 ("In short, respondent EPA has not raised prudential standing. EPA has thus
forfeited the argument.").
81. Id. at 186, 192 ("On the merits, EPA's E15 waiver is flatly contrary to the plain text of the
statute.").

82. Id. at 185.
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raised." In addition, the Fourth Circuit has also deemed prudential
standing to be non-jurisdictional.84
Table I summarizes the circuit split." In addition, three circuits
have either expressly declined to deliver a view or not rendered a clear
holding on the topic. The Third and Eighth Circuits have expressly
declined to choose a side in this split.86 The First Circuit has been less
than clear on its view.87 Even so, the First Circuit has previously noted

&

&

83. Id. at 184-85 ("Unlike constitutional standing, prudential standing arguments may be
waived." (quoting Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm'rs v. E.P.A., 674 F.3d 409, 417 (5th Cir. 2012)))
("Unlike the Article III standing inquiry, whether ILC maintains prudential standing is not a
jurisdictional limitation on our review. By failing to articulate any argument challenging ILC's
prudential standing, the Director has waived that argument." (quoting Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Ca.,
Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 n.17 (9th Cir. 2008))) ("Prudential-standing doctrine is not
jurisdictional in the sense that Article III standing is." (quoting Rawoof v. Texor Petroleum Co., 521
F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2008))) ("Prudential standing is not jurisdictional in the same sense as
Article III standing. . .. We could therefore decline to address this argument, as it was not raised in
the court below." (quoting Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007))) ("In the
end, we do not need to reach or decide the question whether Gilda satisfies the standing
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, because the government did not contend in its
brief that Gilda's complaint should be barred by the zone of interests test. The government has thus
waived that argument." (quoting Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1271, 1280 (Fed. Cir.
2006))) ("We can pretermit the more difficult question regarding whether the Doctors' members'
interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the OSH Act because prudential standing is
flexible and not jurisdictional in nature." (quoting Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. O.S.H.A., 182 F.3d
1261, 1274 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999))).
84. United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 721 (4th Cir. 2012) ("Unlike Article III standing,
issues of prudential standing are non-jurisdictional and may be pretermitted in favor of a
straightforward disposition on the merits." (quoting Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1147)).
85. See infia Table 1.
86. See Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe. LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 938 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that the
Eighth Circuit "has never directly decided whether prudential standing is a waivable exercise in
judicial self-restraint or a jurisdictional bar 'determining the power of the court to entertain the
suit."' (quoting Urban Contractors All. of St. Louis v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 531 F.2d 877, 881 (8th
Cir. 1976))). The Lucas Court went on cite Judge Kavanaugh's GMA dissent and noted that the
panel was "reluctant-without the benefit of dedicated briefing, which the parties have not
provided --to venture into the 'deep and important circuit split on this important issue."' Id.
(quoting Grocert Mis., 693 F.3d at 185 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)); Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d
325, 340 n.14 (3d Cir. 2012) ("We have previously acknowledged the divide in our sister
circuits . . but we have thus far not decided the issue. Because we hold that Plaintiffs have satisfied
the requirements for prudential standing, we similarly decline to decide the issue now." (citing UPS
Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. U.S.P.S., 66 F.3d 621, 626 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995))).
87. In one 2001 case, the First Circuit acknowledged a then-existent circuit split and expressly
declined to reach a decision on whether prudential jurisdiction was waivable. Pharm. Research
Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 73 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Pharm. Research
Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003). A later case suggested in dicta that prudential
jurisdiction was non-jurisdictional. See Latin Am. Music Co. v. Archdiocese of San Juan of Roman
Catholic & Apostolic Church, 499 F.3d 32, 46 (1st Cir. 2007) ("A question of who may assert an
otherwise justiciable claim is a question of prudential standing that does not implicate the court's
jurisdiction." (citing Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006))). In another case, the First
Circuit noted that prudential standing considerations were important but "not as inexorable as their
Article III counterparts." Pagan v. Calder6n, 448 F.3d 16, 27 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
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that the prudential standing issue of third-party standing was
"unnecessary" for the purpose of determining jurisdiction." The
Supreme Court has never specifically decided whether prudential
standing is non-jurisdictional. 89
Table 1: Circuit Split on the JurisdictionalNature
of PrudentialStanding
Prudential Standing is Jurisdictional
(Non-Waivable)

D.C. Circuit
*

Representative Case: Ass'n of Battery

Recyclers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 716 F.3d
667 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
Second Circuit
* Representative Case: Wright v.

BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79
(2nd Cir. 2000)
Sixth Circuit
*
Representative Case: Cmty.
First Bank v. Nat'l Credit Union

Admin., 41 F.3d 1050 (6th Cir.
1994)

Prudential Standing is not Jurisdictional
(Waivable if not raised by parties)
Fourth Circuit
* Representative Case: United States v.

Day, 700 F.3d 713 (4th Cir. 2012)
Fifth Circuit
*

Representative Case: Bd. of Miss.

Levee Comm'rs v. EPA, 674 F.3d
409 (5th Cir. 2012)
Seventh Circuit
* Representative Case: Rawoof v. Texor

Petroleum Co., 521 F.3d 750 (7th
Cir. 2008)
Ninth Circuit
* Representative Case: Indep. Living

Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry. 543 F.3d
1050 (9th Cir. 2008)
Tenth Circuit
* Representative Case: Finstuen v.

Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139
(10th Cir. 2007)
&

Eleventh Circuit
* Representative Case: American Iron

Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261
(1 I th Cir. 1999)
Federal Circuit
* Representative Case: Gilda Indus. v.

United States, 446 F.3d 1271 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)

AVX Corp., 962 F.2d. 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1992)). Finally, the First Circuit noted that it could
consider prudential ripeness-a related prudential justiciability doctrine-on its own motion,

"regardless of the parties' own wishes." Reddy v. Foster, 845 F.3d 493, 500-01 n.6 (1st Cir. 2017)
(citing Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)).
88. Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 972 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993).
89. See Ass'n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 716 F.3d 667, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(Silberman, J., concurring); see also Mank, supra note 54, at 263 ("[T]he Lexmark decision's
changing of some of the prudential standing rules and classifications answers some questions, but
leaves many for another day.").
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In the wake of GMA and Judge Kavanaugh's dissent, Judge
Silberman responded to the concerns raised therein regarding prudential
standing." Writing in a concurring opinion, Judge Silberman noted that
the D.C. Circuit "ought to be especially hesitant to overturn past
precedent on these issues until the Supreme Court has provided clear
guidance." 1 Further, he noted that even if a court was not required to
raise the issue of prudential standing sua sponte, it had the authority
to do so.9 2
A HarvardLaw Review recent case note advocated for a prudential
standing approach based on the separation of powers. 93 This proposal
suggested that the executive branch should be able to concede prudential
standing questions as to move directly to the determination of the
merits.9 4 Noting that federal agencies often do not challenge the standing
of plaintiffs in regulatory actions, 5 the case note author would empower
the executive branch to waive prudential standing concerns to promote
the efficient review of the statutory authority delegated to the executive
by Congress." Such a proposal would be frustrated by the D.C. Circuit's
mandatory jurisdictional review of prudential standing issues, as
described in GMA. 9" According to the case note, "[i]t is especially
important for litigants in the circuit court that hears a large share of
challenges to federal regulations to have clarity on when prudential
standing will bar plaintiffs from suing the federal government,
increasing the urgency of resolving this uncertainty through"
further review.9
While the lower federal courts await further guidance from the
Supreme Court, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has
recently cast doubt on the continuing relevance and validity of the
prudential standing doctrine. In a unanimous 2014 opinion, Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the Court noted

90. Id. at 675-78.
91. Id at 678.
92. Id. ("[A] court may consider an issue 'antecedent to . .. and ultimately dispositive of the
dispute before it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief."' (quoting U.S. Nat'l Bank of
Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Ain., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993))).
93. Recent Case, Federal Civil Procedure-Standing-D.C. Circuit Raises Prudential
Standing Sua Sponte to Dismiss Regulator Challenge on Jurisdictional Grounds-Grocery

Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA, 693 F3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012), reh'g en banc denied, No. 10-1380
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2013), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1446. 1450-51 (2013) [hereinafter "HLR Recent
Case "].
94. Id. at 1452.
95. Id. at 1451.
96. Id. at 1452.
97. Id. at 1450 & n.45.
98. Id. at 1453.
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the tension between the prudential standing doctrine and that of the
principle that "a federal court's 'obligation' to hear and decide cases
within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging." 9 9 Moreover, Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, described the term "prudential standing" as
"misleading." 0 Such an "unflagging" obligation hearkens back to
Supreme Court precedent from as far back as 1821, when Chief Justice
John Marshall noted:
We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other
would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we
would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to
exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.""
In another unanimous decision from 2014, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the "virtually unflagging" obligation but explicitly
declined to resolve the continuing vitality of prudential ripeness, a
related prudential ground for courts declining to exercise review. 0 2 In
that case, the Court noted that "the doctrines of standing and ripeness
'originate' from the same Article III limitation."' 3 Further, the Court
noted that the standing and ripeness issues may boil down to the same
question, and the Court may sometimes use the term "standing" to
describe both ripeness and standing questions.1 04
If Lexmark is to be taken seriously, all prudential based rules of
justiciability are in question. Under a strict interpretation of Lexmark,
courts have a "virtually unflagging" obligation to hear cases and must
not limit causes of action "merely because 'prudence' dictates."o1 That
is, doctrines of abstention, standing, ripeness, and mootness based on
judge-made rules would be abrogated under such a strict interpretation.
The Eleventh Circuit recently sidestepped such a strict interpretation.
Noting that Lexmark called into question prudential standing principles,
the Circuit labeled at least part of the Court's discussion with regard to
prudential standing as dicta. 0 6 The Fifth Circuit similarly applied its
99. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)
(quoting Sprint Commc'ns Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)).
100. Id. at 1386; see also Ass'n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 716 F.3d 667, 675-76
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring) (calling "prudential standing" a "misnomer").
101. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
102. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014).
103. Id. at 2341 n.5 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332. 335 (2006)).
104. Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 n.5.
105. Lexmark. 134 S. Ct. at 1386-87 (quoting Sprint Commc'ns Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584,
591 (2013)).
106. Duty Free Ams., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 797 F.3d 1248, 1273 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015)
(labeling Lexmark's discussion of antitrust standing, a prudential standing doctrine, as dicta and not
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own prudential standing precedent and labeled Lexmark as noncontrolling."' In that case, the Fifth Circuit noted that it was "bound to
follow [its] precedent until the Supreme Court squarely holds to
the contrary."'O8
Circuit courts have continued to question prudential aspects of
justiciability after the Supreme Court's decisions. The Fifth Circuit
found that the "continued vitality of prudential 'standing' is now
uncertain in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc."o' The Sixth
Circuit noted that "the Court has placed the continuing vitality of the
prudential aspects of standing and ripeness . .. in doubt."'"o In
discussing recent Supreme Court cases, the Sixth Circuit also noted that
"the Supreme Court has expressed disfavor for prudential doctrines that
abdicate jurisdiction and has emphasized the duty federal courts have to
exercise jurisdiction.""' Even so, the circuit found that the Supreme
Court had not abolished prudential doctrines, such as the prudential
source of the mootness doctrine, and such prudential concerns remained
the law of the circuit." 2 In another case, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged
its "unflagging obligation" to decide cases within its jurisdiction and
analyzed ripeness concerns under the constitutional standing framework,
relegating prudential ripeness factors to a footnote."13
More recently, in Miller, the Sixth Circuit wrote, "[g]iven the
Supreme Court's questioning of the continued vitality of the prudentialstanding doctrine . . and the doubt that has been cast upon it by our own
decisions . . . we are hesitant to ground our decision in prudentialstanding principles."" 4 While the Miller majority noted that the
prudential standing doctrine is not a dead doctrine, the court declined to

applying it to the case at bar).

107. Superior MRI Servs., Inc. v. All. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 502. 506 (5th Cir.
2015).
108. Id. (citing Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 394 (5th Cir. 2014)).
109. Excel Willowbrook, L.L.C. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 758 F.3d 592, 603
n.34 (5th Cir. 2014).
110. Kentucky v. U.S. cx rel. Hagel, 759 F.3d 588, 596 n.3 (6th Cir. 2014) (first citing Susan
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014); and then citing Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at
1386-88).
111. In re City of Detroit, 838 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2016).
112.

Id.

113. Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 6011 606-07, 607 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014).
114. Miller v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 503 n.2 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Lemark, 134 S.
Ct. at 1386; and then citing Kiser, 765 F.3d at 606-07).
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predict its future."' Instead, they chose "to rely on a more solid
foundation for deciding the case," Article III standing.116
Professor Brown has noted that it is time to write the epilogue for
the story of prudential standing."' The place of prudential standing in
modem jurisprudence is "perplexing.""' In the words of the Harvard
Law Review, prudential standing jurisprudence is "ripe for
clarification."I' Given the split justiciability analysis in Miller, the Sixth
Circuit's recent case provides jurists further insight into the federal
courts' discretion to decline review.
V.

MILLER V. CITY OF WICKLIFFE: SAME FACTS,
DIFFERENT JUSTICIABILITY STANDARD

The Supreme Court has noted that issues of standing and ripeness
draw from the same constitutional source and may sometimes boil down
to the same question.' 20 Miller is one such case. On the same facts, the
Sixth Circuit panel split with the majority analyzing justiciability using
Article III standing and Judge Rogers' concurrence evaluating the facts
under the prudential ripeness rubric.' 2 ' Along the way, the majority
suggested that prudential standing grounds were less solid than
Article III standing and noted that prudential standards for court to
decline review are in doubt.1 22
The facts of the Miller case centered on the Mosley Motel in
Wickliffe, Ohio, which is located near Cleveland.1 23 JUlioUS Mosely
owned the motel and was seeking a new tenant for its lounge space.1 2 4 in
2009, he contracted with Dan Miller to open a nightclub in the motel. 2 1
Miller claimed that the city was initially receptive to the nightclub idea,
but abruptly changed its attitude after he told the city of his plans to cater
to an "African American and minority clientele."' 2 6 After Miller and
Mosely executed a five-year lease, the city denied them an occupancy
115. Miller, 765 F.3d at 503 n.2.
116. Id.
117.

Brownsupra note 50, at 133.

118.

Id. at96.

119.

HLR Recent Case, supra note 93, at 1450.

120.
Immune,
121.
122.

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5 (2014) (quoting Meadow
Inc. v. Greentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007)).
Miller v. City ofWickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 502-04, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 503 n.2.

123.

Id. at 499 (describing the facts of the case).

124.

Id.

125. Id. In a related move, Wickliffe also sent Miller a cease-and-desist letter after a billiards
hall, in which he had an ownership stake, stating it was allegedly too close to being a "nightclub."

Id. at 501.
126. Id. at 500.
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permit until parking issues were resolved.1 2 7 Also, the state declined to
give the nascent nightclub a liquor license after holding a hearing on
the matter.' 2 8 The negative decision was supported by a non-binding
city resolution and vocal opposition to the permit from local
religious organizations.129
The city then passed Ordinance 2009-49 ("the Ordinance"), which
mandated that nightclubs must have a permit prior to operation.' The
Ordinance defined nightclubs as follows:
[A] place operated for a profit, which is open to the public and
provides the opportunity to engage in social activities such as dancing;
the enjoyment of live or prerecorded music; the serving of food and
beverages, all of which are provided for a consideration that may
be included in a cover charge or included in the price of the food
or beverage.131

The Ordinance also detailed the proper closing time for nightclubs,
required that nightclubs be operated in safe and legal manner, and
provided for a specific application process.' 3 2 The plaintiffs never
applied for a permit, alleging that such an application would have been
futile.'13 Instead, plaintiffs and their related business entities brought suit
alleging a variety of claims, including tortious interference with contract,
takings, and racial discrimination.134
In district court, the plaintiffs' claims were primarily dismissed
based on lack of standing.' 3 5 The Miller majority focused on the district
court's denial of review based on Article III standing, specifically its
first injury-in-fact prong." 6 The district court had put it simply:
"Plaintiffs needed to at least apply for a permit to operate a nightclub

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130.
131.

Id
Id. (citing WICKLIFFE, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES

132.
133.
134.

Id. at 500-01.
Id. at 502.
Id at 501.

§ 747.03

(2009)).

135. Id. at 501. In the trial court, Judge James S. Gwin also relied on the state's decision to
deny the liquor permit as grounds for redressability under Article III standing as an independent
reason to dismiss the case. Id. at 503 n.1. Judge Gwin reasoned that without serving liquor, the
nightclub could not effectively operate. Id. The Sixth Circuit found that such an assumption was
error but that it did not affect the overall outcome. Id. Instead, they placed the onus of the standing
test on the local ordinance not the alcohol permit. Id at 503. But cf JAMIE FOXX FEAT. T-PAIN,
Blame It (On the Alcohol), on INTUITION (J Records 2008) (concluding repeatedly that the blame
should lay with the alcohol).

136. Miller, 852 F.3d at 502-04.
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before suing for being improperly denied the right to operate
a nightclub."'1 7

If the Miller plaintiffs instead wanted to bring suit to challenge the
Ordinance itself, the district court found they could not show more than
a "generalized grievance," which is insufficient to confer standing."3
The district court opinion cited to the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in
Hollingsworth v. Perry,'3 which concerned California's Proposition 8.
The Hollingsworth Court was blunt: "We have repeatedly held that such
a 'generalized grievance,' no matter how sincere, is insufficient to
confer standing.""'
Interestingly, the Hollingsworth Court suggested that the
"generalized grievance" jurisprudence was prudential, or judge-made, in
nature, yet it framed its discussion within Article III. "' As noted above,
the prohibition against courts deciding "generalized grievances" has
traditionally been a core principle of prudential standing. 142 However,
the Supreme Court has recently recast it within constitutional terms.143
Whether that recasting is dictum or not, the reasoning is echoed in
Hollingsworth, as the Court noted:

Federal courts have authority under the Constitution to answer such
questions only if necessary to do so in the course of deciding an actual
"case" or "controversy." As used in the Constitution, those words do
not include every sort of dispute, but only those "historically viewed as
capable of resolution through the judicial process." . . . This is an
137. Miller v. City ofWickliffe, No. 1:12-CV-1248, 2015 WL 9304665, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec.
21, 2015) (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1972)), qffd sub non. 852
F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2017).
138. Id. at *5 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652. 2662 (2013)). The Sixth
Circuit noted that Judge Gwin had invoked prudential standing considerations when referring to
"generalized grievances." Hiller, 852 F.3d at 503.
139. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
140. Id. at 2662.
141. See Brown, supra note 50, at 109-10 ("[T]he precise foundation of the generalized
grievances principle has been a source of confusion historically."). Compare Lextmark Int'l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components. Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3 (2014) (noting that the bar against
"generalized grievances" arises from constitutional sources, not prudential ones), with Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (finding that prudential standing includes generalized grievances),
and Miller, 852 F.3d at 503-04 (noting that "generalized grievances" fall under the prudential
standing requirements).
142. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) ("[T]he rule barring
adjudication of generalized grievances [is] more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches . . . ." (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751)).
143. See Lexnark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74
(1992) ("[R]aising only a generally available grievance about government---claiming only harm to
his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large-does not state an
Article Ill case or controversy."); see also Brown, supra note 50, at 109-10.
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essential limit on our power: It ensures that we act as judges, and do
not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives. 144

The Hollingsworth Court explained that the "generalized
grievance" jurisprudence concerned the federal court's proper role:
The doctrine of standing, we recently explained, "serves to prevent the
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches" .... In light of this "overriding and time-honored concern
about keeping the Judiciary's power within its proper constitutional
sphere, we must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the
merits of [an] important dispute and to 'settle' it for the sake of
convenience and efficiency." 1 45

With the same breath, the Hollingsworth Court discussed both
Article III standing's injury-in-fact prong and the prudential concern of
"generalized grievances":
The Article III requirement that a party invoking the jurisdiction
of a federal court seek relief for a personal, particularized injury
serves vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in our system
of separated powers. "Refusing to entertain generalized grievances
ensures that . . . courts exercise
power that is judicial
in
nature," . . . and ensures that the Federal Judiciary respects
"the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society." 46

The courts can, and do, refuse to hear "generalized grievances" but
their reasoning for doing so is now generally grounded using the
terminology of Article III's injury-in-fact prong. 147 Yet, traditionally, the
refusal to exercise jurisdiction in such cases stems not from the core
constitutional standing inquiry, but instead from judge-made, prudential
concerns against third-party standing and the proper role of the judiciary
in the constitutional system.1 48 Even so, the source of the prohibition on
hearing "generalized grievances" has vacillated between constitutional
and prudential and has been inconsistent over time.1 49

144.

Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659 (citations omitted).

145.

Id at 2661 (citation omitted).

146.

Id. at 2667 (citations omitted).

147. See, e.g., id.; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).
148. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975).
149. See Stem, supra note 31, at 1204-14. It is worth noting that Justice Scalia's view was
rather consistent, noting in a law review article from 1983 that courts should be obligated to hear
cases without concerns for prudential standing. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 885 (1983) ("As I
would prefer to view the matter, the Court must always hear the case of a litigant who asserts the
violation of a legal right.").
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Professor Ernest A. Young has cast the current state of the source
of "generalized grievances" prohibition as "a constitutional core within a
prudential penumbra.""'o Perhaps, as another commenter noted, the
Court's inconsistency may enable Justices to shift the source, between
prudential and constitutional, when they desire more flexibility in the
application of the "generalized grievances" doctrine.`
Turning back to Miller, the majority cast the home for "generalized
grievances" in the prudential standing realm. 52 The majority suspected
that the prudential standing doctrine was all but a dead letter and was
hesitant to ground its reasoning on this foundation as it was in
question.15 1 Instead, the Miller Court chose the "more solid" foundation
of Article III standing principles.1 54
Accordingly, the Miller majority avoided any discussion of
prudential principles in its review of the plaintiffs' standing.' 55 Instead,
the court found that the injury-in-fact was lacking, as any injury was
merely hypothetical without final decision on the nightclub permit as the
plaintiffs had not even applied for one.15 1 Without a final decision, the
case was also not ripe for judicial review.157
With regard to the facial challenge to the Ordinance's validity, the
court found that the standing and ripeness question boiled down to the
same question: Have plaintiffs established a credible threat of
enforcement?"' The answer to the question was no,159 as the court found
that a sufficiently credible threat of enforcement could not be established
because the plaintiffs had not applied for a license."1o
If the Miller majority had not doubted the prudential standing
doctrine's future, it may have utilized the "generalized grievance"
framework, as the trial court had done. For example, the Sixth Circuit
has previously nested the "generalized grievance" issue within its injury150. Ernest A. Young, PrudentialStanding After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. PoL'Y, 2014, at 149, 154.

151.

See Stem, supra note 31, at 1214-17; see also U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 2701

(2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Relegating a jurisdictional requirement to 'prudential' status is a
wondrous device, enabling courts to ignore the requirement whenever they believe it 'prudent'which is to say, a good idea.").

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Miller v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 503 n.2.
Id.
See id. at 503-07.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 506.
Id.

159.

Id.; see also MEGHAN TRAINOR, No, on THANK YOU (Epic Records 2016).

160.

Miller, 852 F.3d at 506 ("[PllaintitTs needed only to apply for a license to discover

whether they could open their businesses. This not only would have solved their facial-standing
problem, but would have given them standing for a bevy of as-applied challenges as well.").
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The Miller Court's doubts

about the continuing vitality of prudential standing principles, which
may or may not include "generalized grievances," might explain why the
court stayed away from such an analysis here.
Writing in concurrence, Judge Rogers agreed that the case was not
justiciable.'1 2 Judge Rogers would have decided the case not on issues of
constitutional justiciability, but instead upon the court's equitable
powers to decline review.' In this case, Judge Rogers found it would be
inappropriate to engage in pre-enforcement review of the Ordinance.164
Judge Rogers noted that the Supreme Court has called into doubt the
courts' prudential discretion to decline review, but he emphasized that
the Court has never explicitly discarded it.'6 5 Like Judge Tatel's
concurrence in GMA, Judge Rogers would have the court apply
prudential principles to decline review in the absence of a clear Supreme
Court ruling to the contrary.' 66
Instead of seeing prudential discretion as a dead letter, as the Miller
majority implied, Judge Rogers applied that prudential principles lead to
the same result.'"' For him, the case was not ripe to be tried.' Applying
prudential ripeness principles, he found the issues in the case were not fit
for judicial decision and that the parties would suffer minimal hardship
if judicial review was denied.' 9 He noted that there were separation of
powers issues involved in the case: "Ruling on Article III standing
grounds unnecessarily limits the power of Congress."' He found there
was no need to reach Article III standing at all given that the case was
not ripe;17' ripeness issues alone would preclude judicial review.
Instead of grounding his review on Article III grounds, Judge
Rogers focused on the courts' equitable power to decline review. As the
Supreme Court has noted, the ripeness doctrine is "drawn both from
Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for
refusing to exercise jurisdiction."172 Both prudential standing and

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
424 U.S.

Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, 767 F.3d 533, 543 (6th Cir. 2014).
Miller, 852 F.3d at 507 (Rogers, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 507-08.
Id.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (citing Buckley v. Valeo,
1, 114 (1976) (per curiam)).
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prudential ripeness relate to the proper role of the courts in deciding
disputes and arise, at least in part, from judge-made standards.
Given the circuit split regarding prudential standing issues, Judge
Rogers may have chosen the prudential ripeness standard as the Court
has been considerably clearer as to whether courts may raise that issue
sua sponte. The Court has unquestionably allowed prudential ripeness
issues to be raised in the first instance by the court itself, writing in
1993, "[e]ven when a ripeness question in a particular case is prudential,
we may raise it on our own motion, and 'cannot be bound by the wishes
of the parties.""" That principle was more recently upheld in a 2003
case.' 74 In the wake of the D.C. Circuit's GMA4 decision, at least one
judge in that Circuit has postulated that prudential standing may be on
the same footing as prudential ripeness.1 75 Even as that D.C. Circuit
judge found "nothing improper about raising [prudential standing]
issue[s] ourselves where the parties do not,"'17 Judge Rogers may have
been hesitant to do so even as he utilized a related prudential
justiciability doctrine to argue that the court should decline review.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND CONFUSION

Justiciability doctrines dictate that parties must have standing to
bring suit in federal courts and the issues involved in those suits must be
ripe. These standards derive both from Article III as well as judge-made
prudential jurisprudence. In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent
rulings, 7 7 scholars and jurists have been left without ample guidance
about the extent of the Court's stated aversion to prudential justiciability
doctrines.'1 7 Both the Miller majority and the concurring opinion
referred to the doubt cast by the Court's recent statements regarding the
''virtually unflagging" obligation for federal courts to hear and decide
cases within its jurisdiction.179

173. Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18 (quoting Reg'1 Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
138 (1974)).
174. Nat'1 Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) ("[E]ven in a
case raising only prudential concerns, the question of ripeness may be considered on a court's own

motion." (citing Reno. 509 U.S. at 57 n.18)).
175. Ass'n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 716 F.3d 667, 678 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(Silberman, J., concurring) ("Prudential standing might therefore stand on the same footing as
prudential ripeness.").

176.
177.
see also
178.
179.

Id. at 678.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386-87 (2014):
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014).
Young, supranote 150, at 161-63.
Miller v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 503 n.2 (6th Cir. 2017); id. at 507 (Rogers, J.,

concurring).
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In particular, confusion persists in the federal courts regarding
prudential standing, from its jurisdictional nature to its continuing
vitality. With regard to jurisdiction, a "deep and important" circuit split
has developed.'s Three circuits would allow courts to raise the issue of
prudential standing sua sponte, and seven circuits would deem these
arguments waived if not argued by the parties."' Put simply, the
Court has yet to adequately articulate whether the mandates of
prudential standing are mandatory aspects of federal courts' exercise
of jurisdiction.18
The Supreme Court's stated disfavor of prudential principles may
create a chilling effect for jurists. Read broadly, all prudential standards
for the courts to decline to exercise judicial review have been called into
doubt by strong language from the Supreme Court.8 3 As such, lower
courts may be wary to utilize prudential principles or analysis,
particularly prudential standing, in deciding cases. Given the questions
about the continuing vitality of prudential justiciability standards,
the Miller majority preferred the "more solid" foundation of
constitutional analysis. 184
Prudential justiciability standards particularly that of prudential
standing persist but have been called into doubt. In Miller, Judge
Rogers noted that these doctrines are not yet dead and favored a court's
discretion to avoid review due to prudential concerns.' Similarly, Judge
Tatel's concurrence in GMA4 noted that he was bound by D.C. Circuit
precedent in the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court."'
Overall, Miller demonstrates how jurists may disagree as to which
justiciability standard applies to the same factual scenario. Moreover,
they disputed the source of those standards: judge-made rules or
Article 1II. Given the confusion and disagreement among federal jurists
regarding prudential justiciability standards, the Supreme Court should
act expediently to clarify their sources and potential waiver, especially
with regard to prudential standing principles.

180. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n v. E.P.A., 693 F.3d 169, 183-85 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).

18 1. See supra Table 1.
182. Choosing not to decide does represent a choice in itself. See RUSH, Freewill, on RUSH
(Mercury/Island Records 2011) ("If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.").

183.

Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014)

(noting that federal courts "cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because
'prudence' dictates").
184. See supranote 114 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
186. See supranote 76 and accompanying text.
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